Version v0.3.37 - Implement ChaCha20 nonce extension to support pads larger than 256GB
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@@ -219,8 +219,22 @@ int add_entropy_chacha20(const char* pad_chksum, const unsigned char* entropy_da
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unsigned char buffer[64 * 1024]; // 64KB chunks
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unsigned char keystream[64 * 1024];
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uint64_t offset = 0;
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uint32_t counter = 0;
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uint32_t counter_low = 0;
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uint32_t counter_high = 0;
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time_t start_time = time(NULL);
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// Use extended counter for pads larger than 256GB
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// 256GB = 2^32 blocks * 64 bytes = 274,877,906,944 bytes
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int use_extended = (pad_size > 274877906944ULL);
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// For extended mode, use reduced 8-byte nonce
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unsigned char nonce_reduced[8];
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if (use_extended) {
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memcpy(nonce_reduced, nonce + 4, 8);
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if (display_progress) {
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printf("Using extended counter mode for large pad (>256GB)\n");
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}
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}
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while (offset < pad_size) {
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size_t chunk_size = sizeof(buffer);
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@@ -237,7 +251,15 @@ int add_entropy_chacha20(const char* pad_chksum, const unsigned char* entropy_da
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}
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// Generate keystream for this chunk
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if (chacha20_encrypt(key, counter, nonce, buffer, keystream, chunk_size) != 0) {
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int chacha_result;
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if (use_extended) {
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chacha_result = chacha20_encrypt_extended(key, counter_low, counter_high,
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nonce_reduced, buffer, keystream, chunk_size);
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} else {
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chacha_result = chacha20_encrypt(key, counter_low, nonce, buffer, keystream, chunk_size);
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}
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if (chacha_result != 0) {
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printf("Error: Chacha20 keystream generation failed\n");
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fclose(pad_file);
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chmod(pad_path, S_IRUSR);
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@@ -265,7 +287,16 @@ int add_entropy_chacha20(const char* pad_chksum, const unsigned char* entropy_da
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}
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offset += chunk_size;
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counter += (chunk_size + 63) / 64; // Round up for block count
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// Update counters
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uint32_t blocks = (chunk_size + 63) / 64; // Round up for block count
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uint32_t old_counter_low = counter_low;
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counter_low += blocks;
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// Check for overflow and increment high counter
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if (counter_low < old_counter_low) {
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counter_high++;
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}
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// Show progress for large pads
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if (display_progress && offset % (64 * 1024 * 1024) == 0) { // Every 64MB
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@@ -282,7 +313,8 @@ int add_entropy_chacha20(const char* pad_chksum, const unsigned char* entropy_da
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if (display_progress) {
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show_progress(pad_size, pad_size, start_time);
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printf("\n✓ Entropy successfully added to pad using Chacha20\n");
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printf("\n✓ Entropy successfully added to pad using Chacha20%s\n",
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use_extended ? " (extended counter)" : "");
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printf("✓ Pad integrity maintained\n");
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printf("✓ %zu bytes of entropy distributed across entire pad\n", entropy_size);
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printf("✓ Pad restored to read-only mode\n");
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@@ -129,8 +129,8 @@ int chacha20_block(const uint8_t key[32], uint32_t counter,
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return 0;
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}
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int chacha20_encrypt(const uint8_t key[32], uint32_t counter,
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const uint8_t nonce[12], const uint8_t* input,
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int chacha20_encrypt(const uint8_t key[32], uint32_t counter,
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const uint8_t nonce[12], const uint8_t* input,
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uint8_t* output, size_t length) {
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uint8_t keystream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
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size_t offset = 0;
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@@ -161,3 +161,45 @@ int chacha20_encrypt(const uint8_t key[32], uint32_t counter,
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return 0;
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}
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int chacha20_encrypt_extended(const uint8_t key[32], uint32_t counter_low,
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uint32_t counter_high, const uint8_t nonce[8],
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const uint8_t* input, uint8_t* output, size_t length) {
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uint8_t keystream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
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uint8_t extended_nonce[12];
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size_t offset = 0;
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while (length > 0) {
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/* Build extended 12-byte nonce: [counter_high (4 bytes)][nonce (8 bytes)] */
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u32_to_bytes_le(counter_high, extended_nonce);
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memcpy(extended_nonce + 4, nonce, 8);
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/* Generate keystream block using extended nonce */
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int ret = chacha20_block(key, counter_low, extended_nonce, keystream);
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if (ret != 0) {
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return ret;
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}
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/* XOR with input to produce output */
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size_t block_len = (length < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) ? length : CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
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for (size_t i = 0; i < block_len; i++) {
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output[offset + i] = input[offset + i] ^ keystream[i];
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}
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/* Move to next block */
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offset += block_len;
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length -= block_len;
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counter_low++;
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/* Check for counter_low overflow and increment counter_high */
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if (counter_low == 0) {
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counter_high++;
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/* Check for counter_high overflow (extremely unlikely - > 1 exabyte) */
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if (counter_high == 0) {
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return -1; /* Extended counter wrapped around */
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}
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -63,10 +63,10 @@ int chacha20_block(const uint8_t key[32], uint32_t counter,
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/**
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* ChaCha20 encryption/decryption
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*
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*
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* Encrypts or decrypts data using ChaCha20 stream cipher.
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* Since ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, encryption and decryption are the same operation.
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*
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*
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* @param key[in] 32-byte key
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* @param counter[in] Initial 32-bit counter value
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* @param nonce[in] 12-byte nonce
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@@ -75,10 +75,29 @@ int chacha20_block(const uint8_t key[32], uint32_t counter,
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* @param length[in] Length of input data in bytes
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* @return 0 on success, negative on error
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*/
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int chacha20_encrypt(const uint8_t key[32], uint32_t counter,
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const uint8_t nonce[12], const uint8_t* input,
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int chacha20_encrypt(const uint8_t key[32], uint32_t counter,
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const uint8_t nonce[12], const uint8_t* input,
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uint8_t* output, size_t length);
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/**
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* ChaCha20 encryption/decryption with extended counter (64-bit)
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*
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* Extended version that supports files larger than 256GB by using
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* part of the nonce as a high-order counter extension.
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*
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* @param key[in] 32-byte key
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* @param counter_low[in] Initial 32-bit counter value (low bits)
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* @param counter_high[in] Initial 32-bit counter value (high bits)
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* @param nonce[in] 8-byte reduced nonce (instead of 12)
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* @param input[in] Input data to encrypt/decrypt
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* @param output[out] Output buffer (can be same as input)
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* @param length[in] Length of input data in bytes
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* @return 0 on success, negative on error
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*/
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int chacha20_encrypt_extended(const uint8_t key[32], uint32_t counter_low,
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uint32_t counter_high, const uint8_t nonce[8],
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const uint8_t* input, uint8_t* output, size_t length);
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/*
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* ============================================================================
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* UTILITY FUNCTIONS
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