create daemon
This commit is contained in:
Your Name
675
thrower_daemon/node_modules/@noble/ciphers/aes.js
generated
vendored
Normal file
675
thrower_daemon/node_modules/@noble/ciphers/aes.js
generated
vendored
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,675 @@
|
||||
"use strict";
|
||||
Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
|
||||
exports.unsafe = exports.siv = exports.gcm = exports.cfb = exports.cbc = exports.ecb = exports.ctr = exports.expandKeyDecLE = exports.expandKeyLE = void 0;
|
||||
// prettier-ignore
|
||||
const utils_js_1 = require("./utils.js");
|
||||
const _polyval_js_1 = require("./_polyval.js");
|
||||
const _assert_js_1 = require("./_assert.js");
|
||||
/*
|
||||
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) aka Rijndael block cipher.
|
||||
|
||||
Data is split into 128-bit blocks. Encrypted in 10/12/14 rounds (128/192/256 bits). In every round:
|
||||
1. **S-box**, table substitution
|
||||
2. **Shift rows**, cyclic shift left of all rows of data array
|
||||
3. **Mix columns**, multiplying every column by fixed polynomial
|
||||
4. **Add round key**, round_key xor i-th column of array
|
||||
|
||||
Resources:
|
||||
- FIPS-197 https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/197/final/docs/fips-197.pdf
|
||||
- Original proposal: https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-standards-and-guidelines/documents/aes-development/rijndael-ammended.pdf
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const BLOCK_SIZE = 16;
|
||||
const BLOCK_SIZE32 = 4;
|
||||
const EMPTY_BLOCK = new Uint8Array(BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||||
const POLY = 0x11b; // 1 + x + x**3 + x**4 + x**8
|
||||
// TODO: remove multiplication, binary ops only
|
||||
function mul2(n) {
|
||||
return (n << 1) ^ (POLY & -(n >> 7));
|
||||
}
|
||||
function mul(a, b) {
|
||||
let res = 0;
|
||||
for (; b > 0; b >>= 1) {
|
||||
// Montgomery ladder
|
||||
res ^= a & -(b & 1); // if (b&1) res ^=a (but const-time).
|
||||
a = mul2(a); // a = 2*a
|
||||
}
|
||||
return res;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// AES S-box is generated using finite field inversion,
|
||||
// an affine transform, and xor of a constant 0x63.
|
||||
const sbox = /* @__PURE__ */ (() => {
|
||||
let t = new Uint8Array(256);
|
||||
for (let i = 0, x = 1; i < 256; i++, x ^= mul2(x))
|
||||
t[i] = x;
|
||||
const box = new Uint8Array(256);
|
||||
box[0] = 0x63; // first elm
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 255; i++) {
|
||||
let x = t[255 - i];
|
||||
x |= x << 8;
|
||||
box[t[i]] = (x ^ (x >> 4) ^ (x >> 5) ^ (x >> 6) ^ (x >> 7) ^ 0x63) & 0xff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return box;
|
||||
})();
|
||||
// Inverted S-box
|
||||
const invSbox = /* @__PURE__ */ sbox.map((_, j) => sbox.indexOf(j));
|
||||
// Rotate u32 by 8
|
||||
const rotr32_8 = (n) => (n << 24) | (n >>> 8);
|
||||
const rotl32_8 = (n) => (n << 8) | (n >>> 24);
|
||||
// T-table is optimization suggested in 5.2 of original proposal (missed from FIPS-197). Changes:
|
||||
// - LE instead of BE
|
||||
// - bigger tables: T0 and T1 are merged into T01 table and T2 & T3 into T23;
|
||||
// so index is u16, instead of u8. This speeds up things, unexpectedly
|
||||
function genTtable(sbox, fn) {
|
||||
if (sbox.length !== 256)
|
||||
throw new Error('Wrong sbox length');
|
||||
const T0 = new Uint32Array(256).map((_, j) => fn(sbox[j]));
|
||||
const T1 = T0.map(rotl32_8);
|
||||
const T2 = T1.map(rotl32_8);
|
||||
const T3 = T2.map(rotl32_8);
|
||||
const T01 = new Uint32Array(256 * 256);
|
||||
const T23 = new Uint32Array(256 * 256);
|
||||
const sbox2 = new Uint16Array(256 * 256);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
|
||||
for (let j = 0; j < 256; j++) {
|
||||
const idx = i * 256 + j;
|
||||
T01[idx] = T0[i] ^ T1[j];
|
||||
T23[idx] = T2[i] ^ T3[j];
|
||||
sbox2[idx] = (sbox[i] << 8) | sbox[j];
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { sbox, sbox2, T0, T1, T2, T3, T01, T23 };
|
||||
}
|
||||
const tableEncoding = /* @__PURE__ */ genTtable(sbox, (s) => (mul(s, 3) << 24) | (s << 16) | (s << 8) | mul(s, 2));
|
||||
const tableDecoding = /* @__PURE__ */ genTtable(invSbox, (s) => (mul(s, 11) << 24) | (mul(s, 13) << 16) | (mul(s, 9) << 8) | mul(s, 14));
|
||||
const xPowers = /* @__PURE__ */ (() => {
|
||||
const p = new Uint8Array(16);
|
||||
for (let i = 0, x = 1; i < 16; i++, x = mul2(x))
|
||||
p[i] = x;
|
||||
return p;
|
||||
})();
|
||||
function expandKeyLE(key) {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(key);
|
||||
const len = key.length;
|
||||
if (![16, 24, 32].includes(len))
|
||||
throw new Error(`aes: wrong key size: should be 16, 24 or 32, got: ${len}`);
|
||||
const { sbox2 } = tableEncoding;
|
||||
const k32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(key);
|
||||
const Nk = k32.length;
|
||||
const subByte = (n) => applySbox(sbox2, n, n, n, n);
|
||||
const xk = new Uint32Array(len + 28); // expanded key
|
||||
xk.set(k32);
|
||||
// 4.3.1 Key expansion
|
||||
for (let i = Nk; i < xk.length; i++) {
|
||||
let t = xk[i - 1];
|
||||
if (i % Nk === 0)
|
||||
t = subByte(rotr32_8(t)) ^ xPowers[i / Nk - 1];
|
||||
else if (Nk > 6 && i % Nk === 4)
|
||||
t = subByte(t);
|
||||
xk[i] = xk[i - Nk] ^ t;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return xk;
|
||||
}
|
||||
exports.expandKeyLE = expandKeyLE;
|
||||
function expandKeyDecLE(key) {
|
||||
const encKey = expandKeyLE(key);
|
||||
const xk = encKey.slice();
|
||||
const Nk = encKey.length;
|
||||
const { sbox2 } = tableEncoding;
|
||||
const { T0, T1, T2, T3 } = tableDecoding;
|
||||
// Inverse key by chunks of 4 (rounds)
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < Nk; i += 4) {
|
||||
for (let j = 0; j < 4; j++)
|
||||
xk[i + j] = encKey[Nk - i - 4 + j];
|
||||
}
|
||||
encKey.fill(0);
|
||||
// apply InvMixColumn except first & last round
|
||||
for (let i = 4; i < Nk - 4; i++) {
|
||||
const x = xk[i];
|
||||
const w = applySbox(sbox2, x, x, x, x);
|
||||
xk[i] = T0[w & 0xff] ^ T1[(w >>> 8) & 0xff] ^ T2[(w >>> 16) & 0xff] ^ T3[w >>> 24];
|
||||
}
|
||||
return xk;
|
||||
}
|
||||
exports.expandKeyDecLE = expandKeyDecLE;
|
||||
// Apply tables
|
||||
function apply0123(T01, T23, s0, s1, s2, s3) {
|
||||
return (T01[((s0 << 8) & 0xff00) | ((s1 >>> 8) & 0xff)] ^
|
||||
T23[((s2 >>> 8) & 0xff00) | ((s3 >>> 24) & 0xff)]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
function applySbox(sbox2, s0, s1, s2, s3) {
|
||||
return (sbox2[(s0 & 0xff) | (s1 & 0xff00)] |
|
||||
(sbox2[((s2 >>> 16) & 0xff) | ((s3 >>> 16) & 0xff00)] << 16));
|
||||
}
|
||||
function encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3) {
|
||||
const { sbox2, T01, T23 } = tableEncoding;
|
||||
let k = 0;
|
||||
(s0 ^= xk[k++]), (s1 ^= xk[k++]), (s2 ^= xk[k++]), (s3 ^= xk[k++]);
|
||||
const rounds = xk.length / 4 - 2;
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
|
||||
const t0 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s0, s1, s2, s3);
|
||||
const t1 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s1, s2, s3, s0);
|
||||
const t2 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s2, s3, s0, s1);
|
||||
const t3 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s3, s0, s1, s2);
|
||||
(s0 = t0), (s1 = t1), (s2 = t2), (s3 = t3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// last round (without mixcolumns, so using SBOX2 table)
|
||||
const t0 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s0, s1, s2, s3);
|
||||
const t1 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s1, s2, s3, s0);
|
||||
const t2 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s2, s3, s0, s1);
|
||||
const t3 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s3, s0, s1, s2);
|
||||
return { s0: t0, s1: t1, s2: t2, s3: t3 };
|
||||
}
|
||||
function decrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3) {
|
||||
const { sbox2, T01, T23 } = tableDecoding;
|
||||
let k = 0;
|
||||
(s0 ^= xk[k++]), (s1 ^= xk[k++]), (s2 ^= xk[k++]), (s3 ^= xk[k++]);
|
||||
const rounds = xk.length / 4 - 2;
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
|
||||
const t0 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s0, s3, s2, s1);
|
||||
const t1 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s1, s0, s3, s2);
|
||||
const t2 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s2, s1, s0, s3);
|
||||
const t3 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s3, s2, s1, s0);
|
||||
(s0 = t0), (s1 = t1), (s2 = t2), (s3 = t3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Last round
|
||||
const t0 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s0, s3, s2, s1);
|
||||
const t1 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s1, s0, s3, s2);
|
||||
const t2 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s2, s1, s0, s3);
|
||||
const t3 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s3, s2, s1, s0);
|
||||
return { s0: t0, s1: t1, s2: t2, s3: t3 };
|
||||
}
|
||||
function getDst(len, dst) {
|
||||
if (!dst)
|
||||
return new Uint8Array(len);
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(dst);
|
||||
if (dst.length < len)
|
||||
throw new Error(`aes: wrong destination length, expected at least ${len}, got: ${dst.length}`);
|
||||
return dst;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// TODO: investigate merging with ctr32
|
||||
function ctrCounter(xk, nonce, src, dst) {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(nonce, BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(src);
|
||||
const srcLen = src.length;
|
||||
dst = getDst(srcLen, dst);
|
||||
const ctr = nonce;
|
||||
const c32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(ctr);
|
||||
// Fill block (empty, ctr=0)
|
||||
let { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, c32[0], c32[1], c32[2], c32[3]);
|
||||
const src32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(src);
|
||||
const dst32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(dst);
|
||||
// process blocks
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= src32.length; i += 4) {
|
||||
dst32[i + 0] = src32[i + 0] ^ s0;
|
||||
dst32[i + 1] = src32[i + 1] ^ s1;
|
||||
dst32[i + 2] = src32[i + 2] ^ s2;
|
||||
dst32[i + 3] = src32[i + 3] ^ s3;
|
||||
// Full 128 bit counter with wrap around
|
||||
let carry = 1;
|
||||
for (let i = ctr.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
||||
carry = (carry + (ctr[i] & 0xff)) | 0;
|
||||
ctr[i] = carry & 0xff;
|
||||
carry >>>= 8;
|
||||
}
|
||||
({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, c32[0], c32[1], c32[2], c32[3]));
|
||||
}
|
||||
// leftovers (less than block)
|
||||
// It's possible to handle > u32 fast, but is it worth it?
|
||||
const start = BLOCK_SIZE * Math.floor(src32.length / BLOCK_SIZE32);
|
||||
if (start < srcLen) {
|
||||
const b32 = new Uint32Array([s0, s1, s2, s3]);
|
||||
const buf = (0, utils_js_1.u8)(b32);
|
||||
for (let i = start, pos = 0; i < srcLen; i++, pos++)
|
||||
dst[i] = src[i] ^ buf[pos];
|
||||
}
|
||||
return dst;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// AES CTR with overflowing 32 bit counter
|
||||
// It's possible to do 32le significantly simpler (and probably faster) by using u32.
|
||||
// But, we need both, and perf bottleneck is in ghash anyway.
|
||||
function ctr32(xk, isLE, nonce, src, dst) {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(nonce, BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(src);
|
||||
dst = getDst(src.length, dst);
|
||||
const ctr = nonce; // write new value to nonce, so it can be re-used
|
||||
const c32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(ctr);
|
||||
const view = (0, utils_js_1.createView)(ctr);
|
||||
const src32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(src);
|
||||
const dst32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(dst);
|
||||
const ctrPos = isLE ? 0 : 12;
|
||||
const srcLen = src.length;
|
||||
// Fill block (empty, ctr=0)
|
||||
let ctrNum = view.getUint32(ctrPos, isLE); // read current counter value
|
||||
let { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, c32[0], c32[1], c32[2], c32[3]);
|
||||
// process blocks
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= src32.length; i += 4) {
|
||||
dst32[i + 0] = src32[i + 0] ^ s0;
|
||||
dst32[i + 1] = src32[i + 1] ^ s1;
|
||||
dst32[i + 2] = src32[i + 2] ^ s2;
|
||||
dst32[i + 3] = src32[i + 3] ^ s3;
|
||||
ctrNum = (ctrNum + 1) >>> 0; // u32 wrap
|
||||
view.setUint32(ctrPos, ctrNum, isLE);
|
||||
({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, c32[0], c32[1], c32[2], c32[3]));
|
||||
}
|
||||
// leftovers (less than a block)
|
||||
const start = BLOCK_SIZE * Math.floor(src32.length / BLOCK_SIZE32);
|
||||
if (start < srcLen) {
|
||||
const b32 = new Uint32Array([s0, s1, s2, s3]);
|
||||
const buf = (0, utils_js_1.u8)(b32);
|
||||
for (let i = start, pos = 0; i < srcLen; i++, pos++)
|
||||
dst[i] = src[i] ^ buf[pos];
|
||||
}
|
||||
return dst;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* CTR: counter mode. Creates stream cipher.
|
||||
* Requires good IV. Parallelizable. OK, but no MAC.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
exports.ctr = (0, utils_js_1.wrapCipher)({ blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 16 }, function ctr(key, nonce) {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(key);
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(nonce, BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||||
function processCtr(buf, dst) {
|
||||
const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
|
||||
const n = nonce.slice();
|
||||
const out = ctrCounter(xk, n, buf, dst);
|
||||
xk.fill(0);
|
||||
n.fill(0);
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
encrypt: (plaintext, dst) => processCtr(plaintext, dst),
|
||||
decrypt: (ciphertext, dst) => processCtr(ciphertext, dst),
|
||||
};
|
||||
});
|
||||
function validateBlockDecrypt(data) {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(data);
|
||||
if (data.length % BLOCK_SIZE !== 0) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`aes/(cbc-ecb).decrypt ciphertext should consist of blocks with size ${BLOCK_SIZE}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
function validateBlockEncrypt(plaintext, pcks5, dst) {
|
||||
let outLen = plaintext.length;
|
||||
const remaining = outLen % BLOCK_SIZE;
|
||||
if (!pcks5 && remaining !== 0)
|
||||
throw new Error('aec/(cbc-ecb): unpadded plaintext with disabled padding');
|
||||
const b = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(plaintext);
|
||||
if (pcks5) {
|
||||
let left = BLOCK_SIZE - remaining;
|
||||
if (!left)
|
||||
left = BLOCK_SIZE; // if no bytes left, create empty padding block
|
||||
outLen = outLen + left;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const out = getDst(outLen, dst);
|
||||
const o = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(out);
|
||||
return { b, o, out };
|
||||
}
|
||||
function validatePCKS(data, pcks5) {
|
||||
if (!pcks5)
|
||||
return data;
|
||||
const len = data.length;
|
||||
if (!len)
|
||||
throw new Error(`aes/pcks5: empty ciphertext not allowed`);
|
||||
const lastByte = data[len - 1];
|
||||
if (lastByte <= 0 || lastByte > 16)
|
||||
throw new Error(`aes/pcks5: wrong padding byte: ${lastByte}`);
|
||||
const out = data.subarray(0, -lastByte);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < lastByte; i++)
|
||||
if (data[len - i - 1] !== lastByte)
|
||||
throw new Error(`aes/pcks5: wrong padding`);
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
function padPCKS(left) {
|
||||
const tmp = new Uint8Array(16);
|
||||
const tmp32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(tmp);
|
||||
tmp.set(left);
|
||||
const paddingByte = BLOCK_SIZE - left.length;
|
||||
for (let i = BLOCK_SIZE - paddingByte; i < BLOCK_SIZE; i++)
|
||||
tmp[i] = paddingByte;
|
||||
return tmp32;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* ECB: Electronic CodeBook. Simple deterministic replacement.
|
||||
* Dangerous: always map x to y. See [AES Penguin](https://words.filippo.io/the-ecb-penguin/).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
exports.ecb = (0, utils_js_1.wrapCipher)({ blockSize: 16 }, function ecb(key, opts = {}) {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(key);
|
||||
const pcks5 = !opts.disablePadding;
|
||||
return {
|
||||
encrypt: (plaintext, dst) => {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(plaintext);
|
||||
const { b, o, out: _out } = validateBlockEncrypt(plaintext, pcks5, dst);
|
||||
const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
|
||||
let i = 0;
|
||||
for (; i + 4 <= b.length;) {
|
||||
const { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, b[i + 0], b[i + 1], b[i + 2], b[i + 3]);
|
||||
(o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (pcks5) {
|
||||
const tmp32 = padPCKS(plaintext.subarray(i * 4));
|
||||
const { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, tmp32[0], tmp32[1], tmp32[2], tmp32[3]);
|
||||
(o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
xk.fill(0);
|
||||
return _out;
|
||||
},
|
||||
decrypt: (ciphertext, dst) => {
|
||||
validateBlockDecrypt(ciphertext);
|
||||
const xk = expandKeyDecLE(key);
|
||||
const out = getDst(ciphertext.length, dst);
|
||||
const b = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(ciphertext);
|
||||
const o = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(out);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= b.length;) {
|
||||
const { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = decrypt(xk, b[i + 0], b[i + 1], b[i + 2], b[i + 3]);
|
||||
(o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
xk.fill(0);
|
||||
return validatePCKS(out, pcks5);
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
});
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* CBC: Cipher-Block-Chaining. Key is previous round’s block.
|
||||
* Fragile: needs proper padding. Unauthenticated: needs MAC.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
exports.cbc = (0, utils_js_1.wrapCipher)({ blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 16 }, function cbc(key, iv, opts = {}) {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(key);
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(iv, 16);
|
||||
const pcks5 = !opts.disablePadding;
|
||||
return {
|
||||
encrypt: (plaintext, dst) => {
|
||||
const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
|
||||
const { b, o, out: _out } = validateBlockEncrypt(plaintext, pcks5, dst);
|
||||
const n32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(iv);
|
||||
// prettier-ignore
|
||||
let s0 = n32[0], s1 = n32[1], s2 = n32[2], s3 = n32[3];
|
||||
let i = 0;
|
||||
for (; i + 4 <= b.length;) {
|
||||
(s0 ^= b[i + 0]), (s1 ^= b[i + 1]), (s2 ^= b[i + 2]), (s3 ^= b[i + 3]);
|
||||
({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3));
|
||||
(o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (pcks5) {
|
||||
const tmp32 = padPCKS(plaintext.subarray(i * 4));
|
||||
(s0 ^= tmp32[0]), (s1 ^= tmp32[1]), (s2 ^= tmp32[2]), (s3 ^= tmp32[3]);
|
||||
({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3));
|
||||
(o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
xk.fill(0);
|
||||
return _out;
|
||||
},
|
||||
decrypt: (ciphertext, dst) => {
|
||||
validateBlockDecrypt(ciphertext);
|
||||
const xk = expandKeyDecLE(key);
|
||||
const n32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(iv);
|
||||
const out = getDst(ciphertext.length, dst);
|
||||
const b = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(ciphertext);
|
||||
const o = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(out);
|
||||
// prettier-ignore
|
||||
let s0 = n32[0], s1 = n32[1], s2 = n32[2], s3 = n32[3];
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= b.length;) {
|
||||
// prettier-ignore
|
||||
const ps0 = s0, ps1 = s1, ps2 = s2, ps3 = s3;
|
||||
(s0 = b[i + 0]), (s1 = b[i + 1]), (s2 = b[i + 2]), (s3 = b[i + 3]);
|
||||
const { s0: o0, s1: o1, s2: o2, s3: o3 } = decrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3);
|
||||
(o[i++] = o0 ^ ps0), (o[i++] = o1 ^ ps1), (o[i++] = o2 ^ ps2), (o[i++] = o3 ^ ps3);
|
||||
}
|
||||
xk.fill(0);
|
||||
return validatePCKS(out, pcks5);
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
});
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* CFB: Cipher Feedback Mode. The input for the block cipher is the previous cipher output.
|
||||
* Unauthenticated: needs MAC.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
exports.cfb = (0, utils_js_1.wrapCipher)({ blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 16 }, function cfb(key, iv) {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(key);
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(iv, 16);
|
||||
function processCfb(src, isEncrypt, dst) {
|
||||
const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
|
||||
const srcLen = src.length;
|
||||
dst = getDst(srcLen, dst);
|
||||
const src32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(src);
|
||||
const dst32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(dst);
|
||||
const next32 = isEncrypt ? dst32 : src32;
|
||||
const n32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(iv);
|
||||
// prettier-ignore
|
||||
let s0 = n32[0], s1 = n32[1], s2 = n32[2], s3 = n32[3];
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= src32.length;) {
|
||||
const { s0: e0, s1: e1, s2: e2, s3: e3 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3);
|
||||
dst32[i + 0] = src32[i + 0] ^ e0;
|
||||
dst32[i + 1] = src32[i + 1] ^ e1;
|
||||
dst32[i + 2] = src32[i + 2] ^ e2;
|
||||
dst32[i + 3] = src32[i + 3] ^ e3;
|
||||
(s0 = next32[i++]), (s1 = next32[i++]), (s2 = next32[i++]), (s3 = next32[i++]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// leftovers (less than block)
|
||||
const start = BLOCK_SIZE * Math.floor(src32.length / BLOCK_SIZE32);
|
||||
if (start < srcLen) {
|
||||
({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3));
|
||||
const buf = (0, utils_js_1.u8)(new Uint32Array([s0, s1, s2, s3]));
|
||||
for (let i = start, pos = 0; i < srcLen; i++, pos++)
|
||||
dst[i] = src[i] ^ buf[pos];
|
||||
buf.fill(0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
xk.fill(0);
|
||||
return dst;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
encrypt: (plaintext, dst) => processCfb(plaintext, true, dst),
|
||||
decrypt: (ciphertext, dst) => processCfb(ciphertext, false, dst),
|
||||
};
|
||||
});
|
||||
// TODO: merge with chacha, however gcm has bitLen while chacha has byteLen
|
||||
function computeTag(fn, isLE, key, data, AAD) {
|
||||
const h = fn.create(key, data.length + (AAD?.length || 0));
|
||||
if (AAD)
|
||||
h.update(AAD);
|
||||
h.update(data);
|
||||
const num = new Uint8Array(16);
|
||||
const view = (0, utils_js_1.createView)(num);
|
||||
if (AAD)
|
||||
(0, utils_js_1.setBigUint64)(view, 0, BigInt(AAD.length * 8), isLE);
|
||||
(0, utils_js_1.setBigUint64)(view, 8, BigInt(data.length * 8), isLE);
|
||||
h.update(num);
|
||||
return h.digest();
|
||||
}
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* GCM: Galois/Counter Mode.
|
||||
* Good, modern version of CTR, parallel, with MAC.
|
||||
* Be careful: MACs can be forged.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
exports.gcm = (0, utils_js_1.wrapCipher)({ blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 12, tagLength: 16 }, function gcm(key, nonce, AAD) {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(nonce);
|
||||
// Nonce can be pretty much anything (even 1 byte). But smaller nonces less secure.
|
||||
if (nonce.length === 0)
|
||||
throw new Error('aes/gcm: empty nonce');
|
||||
const tagLength = 16;
|
||||
function _computeTag(authKey, tagMask, data) {
|
||||
const tag = computeTag(_polyval_js_1.ghash, false, authKey, data, AAD);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < tagMask.length; i++)
|
||||
tag[i] ^= tagMask[i];
|
||||
return tag;
|
||||
}
|
||||
function deriveKeys() {
|
||||
const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
|
||||
const authKey = EMPTY_BLOCK.slice();
|
||||
const counter = EMPTY_BLOCK.slice();
|
||||
ctr32(xk, false, counter, counter, authKey);
|
||||
if (nonce.length === 12) {
|
||||
counter.set(nonce);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
// Spec (NIST 800-38d) supports variable size nonce.
|
||||
// Not supported for now, but can be useful.
|
||||
const nonceLen = EMPTY_BLOCK.slice();
|
||||
const view = (0, utils_js_1.createView)(nonceLen);
|
||||
(0, utils_js_1.setBigUint64)(view, 8, BigInt(nonce.length * 8), false);
|
||||
// ghash(nonce || u64be(0) || u64be(nonceLen*8))
|
||||
_polyval_js_1.ghash.create(authKey).update(nonce).update(nonceLen).digestInto(counter);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const tagMask = ctr32(xk, false, counter, EMPTY_BLOCK);
|
||||
return { xk, authKey, counter, tagMask };
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
encrypt: (plaintext) => {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(plaintext);
|
||||
const { xk, authKey, counter, tagMask } = deriveKeys();
|
||||
const out = new Uint8Array(plaintext.length + tagLength);
|
||||
ctr32(xk, false, counter, plaintext, out);
|
||||
const tag = _computeTag(authKey, tagMask, out.subarray(0, out.length - tagLength));
|
||||
out.set(tag, plaintext.length);
|
||||
xk.fill(0);
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
},
|
||||
decrypt: (ciphertext) => {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(ciphertext);
|
||||
if (ciphertext.length < tagLength)
|
||||
throw new Error(`aes/gcm: ciphertext less than tagLen (${tagLength})`);
|
||||
const { xk, authKey, counter, tagMask } = deriveKeys();
|
||||
const data = ciphertext.subarray(0, -tagLength);
|
||||
const passedTag = ciphertext.subarray(-tagLength);
|
||||
const tag = _computeTag(authKey, tagMask, data);
|
||||
if (!(0, utils_js_1.equalBytes)(tag, passedTag))
|
||||
throw new Error('aes/gcm: invalid ghash tag');
|
||||
const out = ctr32(xk, false, counter, data);
|
||||
authKey.fill(0);
|
||||
tagMask.fill(0);
|
||||
xk.fill(0);
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
});
|
||||
const limit = (name, min, max) => (value) => {
|
||||
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(value) || min > value || value > max)
|
||||
throw new Error(`${name}: invalid value=${value}, must be [${min}..${max}]`);
|
||||
};
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* AES-GCM-SIV: classic AES-GCM with nonce-misuse resistance.
|
||||
* Guarantees that, when a nonce is repeated, the only security loss is that identical
|
||||
* plaintexts will produce identical ciphertexts.
|
||||
* RFC 8452, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8452
|
||||
*/
|
||||
exports.siv = (0, utils_js_1.wrapCipher)({ blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 12, tagLength: 16 }, function siv(key, nonce, AAD) {
|
||||
const tagLength = 16;
|
||||
// From RFC 8452: Section 6
|
||||
const AAD_LIMIT = limit('AAD', 0, 2 ** 36);
|
||||
const PLAIN_LIMIT = limit('plaintext', 0, 2 ** 36);
|
||||
const NONCE_LIMIT = limit('nonce', 12, 12);
|
||||
const CIPHER_LIMIT = limit('ciphertext', 16, 2 ** 36 + 16);
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(nonce);
|
||||
NONCE_LIMIT(nonce.length);
|
||||
if (AAD) {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(AAD);
|
||||
AAD_LIMIT(AAD.length);
|
||||
}
|
||||
function deriveKeys() {
|
||||
const len = key.length;
|
||||
if (len !== 16 && len !== 24 && len !== 32)
|
||||
throw new Error(`key length must be 16, 24 or 32 bytes, got: ${len} bytes`);
|
||||
const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
|
||||
const encKey = new Uint8Array(len);
|
||||
const authKey = new Uint8Array(16);
|
||||
const n32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(nonce);
|
||||
// prettier-ignore
|
||||
let s0 = 0, s1 = n32[0], s2 = n32[1], s3 = n32[2];
|
||||
let counter = 0;
|
||||
for (const derivedKey of [authKey, encKey].map(utils_js_1.u32)) {
|
||||
const d32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(derivedKey);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < d32.length; i += 2) {
|
||||
// aes(u32le(0) || nonce)[:8] || aes(u32le(1) || nonce)[:8] ...
|
||||
const { s0: o0, s1: o1 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3);
|
||||
d32[i + 0] = o0;
|
||||
d32[i + 1] = o1;
|
||||
s0 = ++counter; // increment counter inside state
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
xk.fill(0);
|
||||
return { authKey, encKey: expandKeyLE(encKey) };
|
||||
}
|
||||
function _computeTag(encKey, authKey, data) {
|
||||
const tag = computeTag(_polyval_js_1.polyval, true, authKey, data, AAD);
|
||||
// Compute the expected tag by XORing S_s and the nonce, clearing the
|
||||
// most significant bit of the last byte and encrypting with the
|
||||
// message-encryption key.
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 12; i++)
|
||||
tag[i] ^= nonce[i];
|
||||
tag[15] &= 0x7f; // Clear the highest bit
|
||||
// encrypt tag as block
|
||||
const t32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(tag);
|
||||
// prettier-ignore
|
||||
let s0 = t32[0], s1 = t32[1], s2 = t32[2], s3 = t32[3];
|
||||
({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(encKey, s0, s1, s2, s3));
|
||||
(t32[0] = s0), (t32[1] = s1), (t32[2] = s2), (t32[3] = s3);
|
||||
return tag;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// actual decrypt/encrypt of message.
|
||||
function processSiv(encKey, tag, input) {
|
||||
let block = tag.slice();
|
||||
block[15] |= 0x80; // Force highest bit
|
||||
return ctr32(encKey, true, block, input);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
encrypt: (plaintext) => {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(plaintext);
|
||||
PLAIN_LIMIT(plaintext.length);
|
||||
const { encKey, authKey } = deriveKeys();
|
||||
const tag = _computeTag(encKey, authKey, plaintext);
|
||||
const out = new Uint8Array(plaintext.length + tagLength);
|
||||
out.set(tag, plaintext.length);
|
||||
out.set(processSiv(encKey, tag, plaintext));
|
||||
encKey.fill(0);
|
||||
authKey.fill(0);
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
},
|
||||
decrypt: (ciphertext) => {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(ciphertext);
|
||||
CIPHER_LIMIT(ciphertext.length);
|
||||
const tag = ciphertext.subarray(-tagLength);
|
||||
const { encKey, authKey } = deriveKeys();
|
||||
const plaintext = processSiv(encKey, tag, ciphertext.subarray(0, -tagLength));
|
||||
const expectedTag = _computeTag(encKey, authKey, plaintext);
|
||||
encKey.fill(0);
|
||||
authKey.fill(0);
|
||||
if (!(0, utils_js_1.equalBytes)(tag, expectedTag))
|
||||
throw new Error('invalid polyval tag');
|
||||
return plaintext;
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
});
|
||||
function isBytes32(a) {
|
||||
return (a != null &&
|
||||
typeof a === 'object' &&
|
||||
(a instanceof Uint32Array || a.constructor.name === 'Uint32Array'));
|
||||
}
|
||||
function encryptBlock(xk, block) {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(block, 16);
|
||||
if (!isBytes32(xk))
|
||||
throw new Error('_encryptBlock accepts result of expandKeyLE');
|
||||
const b32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(block);
|
||||
let { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, b32[0], b32[1], b32[2], b32[3]);
|
||||
(b32[0] = s0), (b32[1] = s1), (b32[2] = s2), (b32[3] = s3);
|
||||
return block;
|
||||
}
|
||||
function decryptBlock(xk, block) {
|
||||
(0, _assert_js_1.bytes)(block, 16);
|
||||
if (!isBytes32(xk))
|
||||
throw new Error('_decryptBlock accepts result of expandKeyLE');
|
||||
const b32 = (0, utils_js_1.u32)(block);
|
||||
let { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = decrypt(xk, b32[0], b32[1], b32[2], b32[3]);
|
||||
(b32[0] = s0), (b32[1] = s1), (b32[2] = s2), (b32[3] = s3);
|
||||
return block;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Highly unsafe private functions for implementing new modes or ciphers based on AES
|
||||
// Can change at any time, no API guarantees
|
||||
exports.unsafe = {
|
||||
expandKeyLE,
|
||||
expandKeyDecLE,
|
||||
encrypt,
|
||||
decrypt,
|
||||
encryptBlock,
|
||||
decryptBlock,
|
||||
ctrCounter,
|
||||
ctr32,
|
||||
};
|
||||
//# sourceMappingURL=aes.js.map
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user